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ՌՈՒՍԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԱՐԴԻ ՀԻՄՆԱԽՆԴԻՐՆԵՐԸ

Գիտամեթոդական հանդես

ПРОБЛЕМЫ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РУСИСТИКИ

Научно-методический журнал

MAIN ISSUES IN MODERN RUSSIAN STUDIES

Scientific Methodological Journal

ЕРЕВАН 2020

Երևան քաղաքում Մոսկվայի Մ.Վ. Լոմոնոսովի անվան պետական համալսարանի մասնաճյուղ

Филиал Московского государственного университета им. М.В. Ломоносова в г. Ереване

M. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Yerevan branch

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Երաշխավորվել է տպագրության Երևան քաղաքում Մոսկվայի Մ.Վ.Լոմոնոսովի անվան պետական համալսարանի մասնաճյուղի գիտական խորհրդի կողմից

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«ՌՈՒՍԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԱՐԴԻ ՀԻՄՆԱԽՆԴԻՐՆԵՐԸ» գիտամեթոդական հանդեսի առաքելությունը ՀՀ-ում ռուսագիտության՝ որպես լեզվաբանության ճյուղի մասսայականացումն է, ռուսաց լեզվի ուսումնասիրման նկատմամբ հետաքրքրություն առաջացնելը, օտարերկրյա հետազոտողների ուշադրությունը հայ գիտնականների մշակումներին հրավիրելը, դրանով իսկ հայ ռուսագիտության մասսայականացումն է, համատեղ ծրագրերի, դրամաշնորհների մշակման հնարավորության ընձեռումը, մագիստրոսների ներգրավումը հետազոտական աշխատանքներին:

Назначение научно-методического журнала «**ПРОБЛЕМЫ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РУСИСТИКИ**» рассматривается нами в ракурсе популяризации в РА русистики как отрасли языкознания, привлечения интереса к изучению русского языка, привлечения внимания зарубежных исследователей к разработкам армянских ученых и тем самым популяризации армянской русистики, возможности разработки совместных проектов, грантов и пр., привлечения магистрантов к научно-исследовательской работе.

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СУЩНОСТЬ ТЕОРИИ РЕЧЕВОГО АКТА

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АННОТАЦИЯ

В последние годы правила выражения высказываний неоднократно обсуждались в философии языка. Некоторые философы утверждали, что знание значения слова – это просто знание правил и употребления слова. Однако проблема заключается в том, что ни один из этих философов не предложил единой и точной формулировки даже для одного выражения, чтобы проиллюстрировать их смысл. Другие философы языка выдвигали противоположное предположение, утверждая, что такого рода семантических правил вообще не существует.
Ключевые слова: философия языка, теория высказывания, формулировка речевого акта, противоположное предположение.

In everyday life people use language to express feelings or to do things: to declare, to ask, to command, to apologize, to question, to suggest, and also perform other numerous actions. The sentences uttered by people are not mere expressions, but they have also an intention to do something. For instance, after the pope declares *"I now pronounce you man and wife"* the couple will be regarded as officially married.

One of the major questions that speech act theorists are concerned with is what people do when they utter a sentence. For instance, when a speaker utters "Open the window," this speaker fulfills the act of commanding and also expects

the listener to identify the speaker's intention by going to open the window. *Those actions that are fulfilled when the speaker utters a sentence are designated as* ***speech acts***. This definition demonstrates that when people utter expressions, statements or assertions they do not merely utter the sounds or words with a certain grammatical pattern, but they also perform particular actions in the process of speaking.

In typical speech situation, which includes speaker, listener and the speaker's utterance, various types of acts are connected to the utterance. When uttering a speaker sets in motion a speech apparatus and pronounces sounds. At the same time he also performs other acts: speaker either informs listeners or elicits in them boredom and annoyance. Moreover he expresses a statement or asks a question, orders or reports, congratulates or warns, that is to say he performs act from the list, that J.L. Austin called *illocutionary* [1]. Examples of English verbs and verbal groups, which are connected to illocutionary acts, are: *state, assert, describe, warn, remark, criticize, apologize, censure, approve, welcome, promise, express approval, express regret.* Austin claimed that there are more than one thousand these kinds of expressions in English.

According to **John R. Searle** the basic unit of language is not the symbol, sound or sentence, it is the ***production*** of them during the speech act. He suggested that speech acts are shaped by rule-governed behavior. Searle distinguishes two types of rules. First type includes the rules that merely regulate the language. These rules include *predicating* and *referring*, which explain the propositional content. The second type of rules includes *constitutive rules*, which determine behavior. These rules not only allow us to communicate, but also to represent ourselves.

John L. Austin was the first who attempted to demarcate ***constative utterances*** from ***performative utterances***. According to his dichotomy speech acts consists of two distinct categories ***constatives*** *and* ***performatives*** (at first performatives served as an additional category to constatives). The first category, designated as constatives, is compared to the real world and they represent either true or false statements. This category does not denote actions. The second category, called performatives, includes those statements that imply an action.

According to Austin, performative actions are regarded as illocutionary acts, such as *to apologize, to command, to declare and so on.* Constatives are regarded

as actions that represent statements or give descriptions. Searle argues against this suggestion. He claims that describing and stating are also regarded as actions like commanding or apologizing.

In its turn Austin classified performatives into ***explicit*** and ***implicit.*** The differentiation made between explicit and implicit performatives is often referred to as "'conscious-unconscious" or "intentional-unintentional." In fact, Searle accepts utterances as performative only when they are explicit with the verb naming the act, and the verb can be both in passive and active form, the speaker is not lying, and the utterance is not indirect speech act. Searle further believes that performative utterances are also declarations.

Explicit performatives include a performative verb, which clearly conveys the meaning of the utterance, for example, *"I congratulate you with your anniversary."* In this example the performative verb is "to congratulate". In explicit performatives the utterance should be declarative, and the subject should be used in the first person pronoun with an active, present simple verb. But there exist some exceptions, where the subject is in plural and the performative verb is used in passive voice. For example: "The pupils are required to wear black and white uniform."

A performative verb is absent in the case of **implicit performatives.** In order to recognize a performative utterance if it is an implicit performative, we should identify the real intention of the speaker, which is hidden behind the utterance. Context serves as a crucial element for identifying a performative utterance, because it itself does not carry a clear meaning.

In the case of performatives the speaker wants the listener to perform an action. Constatives may be found only in assertions and descriptions. But sometimes even constatives can denote an action, even though it is suggested that felicity conditions are not applicable to constatives. For example, "the door is closed." This utterance may be included in the speech act of directives, as it denotes the speaker's wish to open the door. We can infer from this example that the verges between constatives and performatives are vague and obscure. That was the exact reason why Austin, made another classification, which divided performatives into three subgroups: ***locutionary, illocutionary,*** and ***perlocutionary*** *acts* [2: 405–424].

These are the three essential elements that directly form a speech act and which are closely related to each other. The locutionary act is defined as a mere uttering of some words or meaningful expressions in a certain language, while the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts convey a more complicated message for the listener.

Under **locutionary** act we always understand only the direct and literal meaning of the utterance, that is to say it is the meaning carried by words and their arrangement or structure in the utterance. By naming the speech act locutionary we imply that it has to do with speaker's simple act of uttering something.

Illocutionary acts are regarded as complete speech acts, which are performed in a characteristic utterance. Illocutionary acts are constituted by propositional content of the utterance and by a specific illocutionary force. An illocutionary act (in-locution, in speaking ("in" became "il" through phonetic assimilation)) expresses the speaker's intentions behind the utterance. More precisely the illocutionary act is the production of one concrete sentence in certain circumstances. Illocutionary act by itself is the basic unit of the language.

The *communicative force* of the utterance makes possible the performance of an illocutionary act. The communicative force is also designated as ***illocutionary force*** of an utterance and it is defined as the speaker's intention in producing that utterance. One might utter in order to make a declaration, statement, offer, complaint, promise, suggestion, prediction etc. For example, "it is cold outside!" The illocutionary force here is represented by the speaker's desire directed to the listener to take an umbrella or to not to go outside. Illocutionary act is also defined as the interpretation of the utterance by the listener.

A **perlocutionary** act (per-locutionary, through speaking), also designated as *perlocutionary effect*, is the last element as its performance is caused by locutionary and illocutionary acts. It represents the effect that the speaker wants to have over the listener and his reaction to the utterance. Here are the examples of perlocutionary acts: intimidating, persuading, insulting, frightening, embarrassing, convincing, getting the listener to do something, inspiring, boring and so on. For instance, if someone shouts "Earthquake!" and everyone starts to leave the room then we have a performed perlocutionary act, because the utterance "Earthquake!" convinced people to leave the building.

For better understanding the difference between these three elements here is another example: **Mother**: "Darling, do you want to go out to the concert today?"

Daughter: "I caught a cold."

Mother: "Hmm… It's bad. You'd better stay at home and I'll brew a tea."

In this example the utterance of the daughter is the locutionary act ("I caught a cold."). It is worth of attention that by these words daughter intended to refuse mother's offer to go to the concert, that is to say it is the illocutionary force of the utterance. As the utterance has an illocutionary force it represents an illocutionary act. And the perlocutionary act is represented by mother's intention to brew a tea, that is to say this is the effect that daughter's utterance made on mother. The perlocutionary act deals with the reaction of the listener in a speech act.

It is important to mention that Searle disclaimed the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, suggested by Austin. He replaced this distinction with two aspects of an illocutionary act: propositional content and communicative or illocutionary force. Searle claims: *"The proposition that I will leave may be a common content of different utterances with different illocutionary forces, for I can threaten, warn, state, predict, or promise that I will leave*."[3: 420].

The accomplishment of speech act refers to those forms of behavior, which are regulated by norms and rules. Such acts as asking a question or expressing a statement are regulated in the same way as the course of a horse in chess is subdued to the rules of the game.

To prepare the ground for formulating rules of illocutionary acts such notions as **rules, *propositions, and meaning*** need to be explained.

Rules

In recent years the notion of rules of expressing statements has been discussed in philosophy of language more than once. Some of the philosophers even claimed that the knowing of the meaning of the word is merely the knowing of the rules and usage of the word. But the problem is that none of this philosophers suggested one and precise formulation for even one expression, in order to exemplify the meaning of them. Other philosophers introduced an opposite suggestion, and claimed that such kinds of semantic rules do not exist at all.

Searle suggests that the semantics of the language can be discussed as a set of systems of constitutive rules, and that the illocutionary acts are accomplished in

accordance with these rules. Constitutive rules fall under several categories. What is more none of these categories does not match the rules of etiquette.

Propositions

Different illocutionary acts often have something in common. Let us consider the following sentences:

(1) Will John leave the room?

(2) John will leave the room.

(3) John, leave the room!

(4) Would that John left the room.

(5) If John will leave the room, I will leave also.

When uttering each of these sentences in certain circumstances, we usually perform different illocutionary acts. The first represents a question, the second – an assertion about future, the third – request or order, the fourth an expression of wish, and the last one – hypothetical expression of intention. Though when performing each of these acts the speaker usually performs also complementary acts, which are general to all five illocutionary acts. When uttering each sentence the speaker refers to a particular speaker John and predicates his action of leaving the room. In each of these cases illocutionary acts are different, but non-illocutionary acts of reference and predication are matching.

The reference to some person John and the predication of one and the same action, which are performed in each of the sentences, show that both illocutionary and non-illocutionary acts are connected by general content. The part of the sentence "John will leave the room," represents the element that is the common feature for all the sentences. To highlight this common feature, we can change the sentences: 'I assert that John will leave the room', 'I ask whether John will leave the room', etc.

According to Searle this general content is called *proposition.* He differentiates *illocutionary act* and *propositional content* of illocutionary act. This distinction was mentioned before Searle by such authors as Frege, Sheffer, Lewis, Reichenbach and Hare.

Searle claims *"An assertion is an illocutionary act, but a proposition is not an act at all, although the act of expressing a proposition is part of performing certain illocutionary acts."* [4:48-64]. From the semantic perspective *propositio-*

nal indicator and *the indicator of illocutionary force* are distinguished in the sentence. Searle divided sentence into two parts: *the proposition indicating element* and *the function indicating device*. The **function indicating device** helps to distinguish the proposition, in other words it shows what type of illocutionary act is performed by the speaker when uttering the sentence. Function indicating devices in English are: the mood of the verb, punctuation, stress, intonation contour word order, and performative verbs (e.g. "I forbid," "I promise," "I recommend" etc.).

Since the same proposition can be general to all the types of illocutionary acts, we can distinguish proposition analysis from analysis of different illocutionary acts. Searle points out that there are rules for expressing proposition, predication and reference, but they are different from rules of function indicating.

Meaning

Speech acts are usually produced when pronouncing sounds or when writing marks. But there is crucial difference between merely uttering sounds or writing marks and performing a speech act. One of the differences is that sounds and marks, which make possible the performance of a speech act, *have meaning*. The second difference, closely connected with the first one, is that *one* is characteristically said *to mean something* by those sounds or marks. For explaining this statement Searle gives an example from **Paul Grice's** article, called "Meaning". Grice suggested the following analysis for comprehending the meaning. To say that **A** meant something by **x** is to say that "*A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention*." [5: 377].

Despite of all the advantages that this analysis of meaning has Searle considers it as insufficiently accurate. The first defect of this analysis is that it does not distinguish between various types of effects, with which the speaker intended to affect the listener, i.e. it does not make a difference between ***perlocutionary*** *and* ***illocutionary*** speech acts. The second defect is that it does not take into account the role of the rules of the meaning. That is to say this analysis of meaning do not show the connection between what the speaker wants to say and what his statement meant from the language's perspective. For example, when a person uses an idiom "Best thing since sliced bread." From the first sight this statement does not carry any meaning. But it has a hidden meaning of a good invention or innovation.

Searle claims: *"Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter of convention*." [6].

By performing an illocutionary act the speaker intends to gain a certain result by forcing the listener to identify his/her intention.

Speech acts are also strongly influenced by culture. The manner and the way of performing speech acts may differ depending on the country and culture. For instance, in the Indian culture the statement *"How fat you are!"* has a positive meaning, because being a stout person stands for well-being and wealth. On the contrary, in European countries this statement will be an offensive one. It will be considered as a criticism. In order to compliment a European female on her appearance one should say *"How slim you are!"* Another example of the impact of culture can be a statement used in Thai culture, which is the following: "The baby is very ugly." This is not taken as an offense or criticism as in the past a great many of newborn babies died and people were sure that ghosts were taking the lives of beautiful babies. Therefore being an ugly baby stands for being safe and sound. Every language has their unique speech acts and understanding their nature is significant for achieving competence in communication.

There are not less than twelve significant linguistic parameters, according to which illocutionary acts are classified. The most substantial of these parameters are*: illocutionary point, direction of fit* and *explicit psychological condition.* These three notions make up the basis for the *taxonomy* of the main classes of illocutionary acts. Performative verbs, which make up a paradigm in each of the enumerated types, possess different syntactical properties.

When examining the function of the language in society, one of the main questions remains the following: "How many ways are there to use the language?" But Searle raises another question, taking into account that the basic unit of the language is an illocutionary act: "How many types of illocutionary acts exist?"

Some verbs indicate the method or form of the performance of an illocutionary act, for example, the verb "declare." One can declare orders, commands, promises and information, but the illocutionary act of declaring does not match with the acts of ordering, promising, and informing. We can infer that declaring is not an illocutionary act, but it is the name of the method, by which certain illocu-

tionary act is performed. Declaring never can act as only declaring, it has to be simultaneously an assertion, order, command and so on.

Other examples, in which illocutionary act is blended with methods of its performance, are the following verbs: sympathize, regard as, mean to, intend, and shall. The verb "intend" is obviously non-performative. If one says "I intend" this does not mean to intend to do something. It cannot be considered as an illocutionary act. Only the act of expressing intention can be regarded as an illocutionary one. Intention never serves as a speech act, conversely the expression of intention is usually considered as a speech act, but not always.

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ԽՈՍՔԻ ՏԵՍՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԷՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ

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Հայ-Ռուսական համալսարանի
լեզվաբանության 2-րդ կուրսի մագիստրոս
Երևան, Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն

ԱՄՓՈՓՈՒՄ

Վերջին տարիներին խոսքի արտահայտման կանոնների հասկացությունը բազմիցս քննարկվել է լեզվի փիլիսոփայության մեջ: Որոշ փիլիսոփաներ նույնիսկ պնդում էին, որ բառի նշանակության իմացությունը՝ պարզապես կանոնների եւ խոսքի օգտագործման իմացությունն է: Բայց խնդիրն այն է, որ այդ փիլիսոփաներից ոչ մեկը միասնական և ճշգրիտ ձևակերպում չի առաջարկել նույնիսկ մեկ արտահայտության համար, որպեսզի ցույց տա դրանց իմաստը: Մյուս փիլիսոփաները առաջ են քաշել հակառակ ենթադրությունը և պնդում են, որ նման իմաստային կանոններ ընդհանրապես գոյություն չունեն:

Բանալի բառեր՝ լեզվի փիլիսոփայություն, արտահայտության տեսություն, խոսքի ակտի ձևակերպում, հակառակ ենթադրություն:

THE NATURE OF THE SPEECH ACT THEORY

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ABSTRACT

In recent years the notion of rules of expressing statements has been discussed in philosophy of language more than once. Some of the philosophers even claimed that the knowing of the meaning of the word is merely the knowing of the rules and usage of the word. But the problem is that none of this philosophers suggested one and precise formulation for even one

expression, in order to exemplify the meaning of them. Other philosophers introduced an opposite suggestion, and claimed that such kinds of semantic rules do not exist at all.
Keywords: philosophy of language, theory of utterance, formulation of speech act, opposite assumption.

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